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23 December 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
3. Netherlands New Guinea: Dutch ready to consider talks with Indonesia. *(Page ii)*

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
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
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
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
Netherlands-Indonesia: [Ambassador Rice in The Hague, commenting on Dutch policy toward West New Guinea, states that he sees little prospect that the Netherlands will withdraw in favor of Indonesian administration of the disputed territory as long as Djakarta continues to reject the principle of self-determination for native Papuans. The Dutch have indicated, however, that they will accept some other administration, presumably the UN, to exercise control over the territory pending final determination of its future. The embassy believes that the debate on the government's West New Guinea policy, scheduled for 2 January, is likely to result in a call to consider ways and means of initiating early talks with Indonesia on this question.]

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North Vietnam. North Vietnam appears apprehensive about being repaid in kind for the guerrilla war it sponsors against the South Vietnamese Government. References to "bandit activity of US-Diem rangers" have been appearing in the North Vietnamese press, and Communist officials were reported holding "anti-sabotage" indoctrination meetings in early December. Despite Hanoi's firm control of the general security situation, the North Vietnamese have had difficulty with their Catholic and tribal minorities, and the regime is particularly sensitive to anything that might spark violence among these groups. (Backup, Page 3)

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Sino-Soviet Dispute: A head-on clash over the issue of disarmament took place between the Soviet and Chinese delegates at the recently concluded World Peace Council (WPC) meeting in Stockholm. The Chinese demanded forceful anti-colonial and anti-West tactics. They insisted that revolutionary struggles must not be subordinated to disarmament negotiations and reportedly walked out of one session after the Soviet delegate rebutted this position. The Chinese voted against the Soviet-sponsored resolution on disarmament but could muster support from only a handful of the delegates, including those from Algeria and Tunisia. Chinese speeches at the WPC meeting are the most vehement of the recently revived Sino-Soviet polemics and indicate that Peiping will step up its opposition to Soviet disarmament policy.

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Netherlands-Indonesian Relations

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Ambassador Rice notes that those elements of the Dutch press and parliament which have reacted favorably to earlier unofficial Indonesian feelers indicating willingness to negotiate differences are hard put to persuade others that these pronouncements reflect Indonesian policy. Statements by Indonesian officials during the past few days indicate that Djakarta's position remains rigid, despite earlier assurances that it was ready to explore a peaceful settlement. The Indonesian ambassador to Washington on 20 December told US officials that there is almost no hope of settling the question by other than military action. Sukarno himself has publicly rejected negotiations on any terms other than Dutch surrender of the territory.

Faced with the growing threat of an Indonesian attack against West New Guinea and the inadequacy of Dutch defense forces in the area, the De Quay government is under pressure to enter into open talks with Indonesia to head off the threatened military clash. This pressure comes not only from the opposition Labor party, which has long advocated a more flexible policy in the dispute, but also from the three confessional parties represented in the coalition and from the Roman Catholic and Dutch Reformed Churches. If the government makes no prior move in the direction of talks with the Djakarta government, it is likely to face strong demands for such an initiative during the parliamentary debate on the New Guinea policy on 2 January. All parties support the government's basic position of assuring that the principle of self-determination is accepted as part of any solution to the dispute. There is a difference of opinion, however, as to whether the government should insist on this point and on the presence of a third party as conditions for opening talks.

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North Vietnam's Internal Security Concerns

25X1 [REDACTED] Hanoi's concern about the loyalties of the ethnic minorities in the mountainous area along North Vietnam's western border was reflected in a recent article of the official Nhan Dan headed "Let us prevent and frustrate in time the enemy's plot to sabotage the mountain regions!"

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[REDACTED] Communist officials are trying to enlist tribal support in a program to "guard against US-Diem sabotage." [REDACTED]

While Hanoi has an elaborate informer system and strong military garrisons along its western frontiers, it has repeatedly had trouble with the tribes, which resent central government authority. Tribal raids in the frontier area may have been sparked by severe food shortages this year.

Although apparently less serious in other parts of the country, the food shortage has damaged the government's standing with the rural population. Recently the North Vietnamese party expressed disappointment over the October-November rice harvest and implied that the second successive winter of short rations could be expected. At least a part of Hanoi's food problem is the result of an effort to merge small cooperatives into larger collective units--a move requiring more administrative skill than is available.

25X1 [REDACTED] Resentment of collectivization is strongest among North Vietnam's Catholics, who number between 500,000 and 750,000. In November 1956, smoldering opposition to land reform erupted in a violent outbreak among Catholic peasants that lasted three days and required the help of the regular army to put down. Such open defiance of the regime is rare, but passive resistance to government directives and an occasional outbreak of violence continue to be reported; [REDACTED] Hanoi itself was reportedly the scene of one such incident this summer when a government-organized demonstration turned into a wild riot during which an important oil storage area near the capital was damaged.

Judging by the tone of current press references to "bandit" activity, Hanoi does not feel that the internal security problem has reached major proportions, but the press emphasis being

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given "enemy sabotage" and the capture of "Diem commandos" suggests that dissatisfied elements in the population are being given a reminder of the government's all-pervading watchfulness.

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Chinese and Soviets Clash at World Peace Council

The Soviet-sponsored resolution on holding the next congress of the World Peace Council (WPC) in mid-1962, with disarmament as the only theme, came under sharp attack by the Chinese, who attempted to undercut the Soviet rationale for disarmament negotiations. On 18 December, one day before the meeting ended, Liu Ning-yi, a member of the Chinese Communist party central committee, told the delegates that there are "some who hold that disarmament is the only road to peace," that it is "the key to the solution of all pressing problems of our time," and that "the national independence movement should be subordinated" to it. Rejecting this Soviet view as "erroneous and harmful," Liu insisted that newly independent countries "like Cuba" must not reduce their armed forces but must strengthen them. Speaking earlier, Chinese delegation chief Liao Cheng-chih argued in effect that the US will not disarm and that "Kennedy does not have the slightest sincerity for negotiations."

These statements were intended to win support of the delegates for the Chinese view that Communist-front organizations should be used by the bloc to encourage open revolution in underdeveloped areas. For the Chinese, emphasis on "disarmament," "negotiation," and "peaceful coexistence" saps the fighting will of newly independent and colonial peoples.

The Chinese effort to line up votes against holding a WPC congress exclusively dealing with disarmament failed miserably. The Soviet resolution was carried by a vote of 153 to 27, with Chinese casting 18 of the dissenting votes. Probably in an effort to undercut Peiping's claim to be the only major champion of anti-colonial revolution, the WPC adopted a resolution which calls for "preparations" to be made for a conference on national liberation movement at an unspecified future date.

The Chinese leaders clearly have decided to hit back at Khrushchev for his implicit attacks on them during and after the 22nd Soviet party congress and may hope to turn the argument away from the narrow issues of Albania and the cult of personality--the grounds on which Khrushchev chose to attack them. [redacted]

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